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HOW SHOULD STATES TREAT CRUIKSHANK FOLLOWING 
HELLER? AN ANALYSIS OF A STATE COURT’S ABILITY TO 





Recent developments in case law regarding the incorporation of 
the Second Amendment raise the issue of whether a state court has 
the power to disregard the precedent of the Supreme Court of the 
United States where the court finds the precedent to be sufficiently 
eroded to be considered dead.  Specifically, state courts are faced 
with deciding whether to treat the Second Amendment as incorpo-
rated following the District of Columbia v. Heller
1
 decision in the face of 
United States v. Cruikshank’s2 holding that the Second Amendment is 
not incorporated.
3
  The ability of a state court to disregard precedent 
such as Cruikshank and the scope of such a power, if one indeed ex-
ists, shape our perception of the role of state courts and may rattle 
long-held beliefs regarding the relationship between state courts and 
the Supreme Court. 
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court found that the 
Second Amendment secured an individual’s right to bear arms for 
traditional uses such as self-defense.
4
  This holding, however, is only 
the beginning of a larger, and perhaps more vital, Second Amend-
ment conversation—whether the Second Amendment should be un-
derstood to have been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.  Heller stated that the case did not present the issue of 
incorporation.
5
  The Court went on, however, to note that Cruikshank, 
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2010, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S. Political 
Science, 2005, Kean University.  I would like to thank my grandfather, Arthur J. Jen-
sen, for his love and support and for his guiding role throughout my life.  You will 
always be with me. 
 1 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
 2 92 U.S. 542 (1876). 
 3 Id. at 553. 
 4 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821–22. 
 5 Id. at 2813 n.23. 
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which held that the Second Amendment is not incorporated, “did 
not engage in the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required 
by . . . later cases”  but also noted that other cases “reaffirmed that 
the Second Amendment applies only to the Federal Government.”6  
The Court then cited authorities using natural law and pre-existing-
rights language, which act as strong support for incorporation.
7
  With 
the conflicting messages from the Court, the Heller holding has 
created and will continue to cause confusion for state courts.  For ex-
ample, New York has seemingly ruled both ways on the issue.  In 
People v. Abdullah,
8
 a New York court held that “because the District of 
Columbia is a federal enclave and not a State, Heller is distinguishable 
and its holding does not invalidate New York’s gun possession laws or 
regulations.”9  On the other hand, in People v. Lynch,10 a different New 
York court apparently assumed that Heller applied and found that 
“the Court specifically stated that this right is not unfettered and that 
reasonable regulations for possession of a firearm outside of the 
home shall be allowed.”11 
The question presented is not simply an incorporation issue; the 
threshold question concerning how a state court should treat Heller 
and Cruikshank is whether a state court has the power to disregard 
Supreme Court precedent, and if such a power exists, when a state 
court should do so.  Prior to 1989, many scholars debated the con-
cept of anticipatory overruling.
12
  Anticipatory overruling has been 
defined as the theory that a lower court should disregard Supreme 
Court precedent when the lower court believes that the Supreme 
 
 6 Id.; see also Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894) (reaffirming Cruikshank); 
Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) (reaffirming Cruikshank); United States v. 
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876). 
 7 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2792 n.7, 2793. 
 8 870 N.Y.S.2d 886 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2008). 
 9 Id. at 887. 
 10 No. 2005-2007, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4587 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 16, 2008). 
 11 Id. at *1–2.  Notably, the circuits are now split on the issue of incorporation.   
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that “the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment and ap-
plies it against the states and local governments.”  Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 457 
(9th Cir. 2009).  Conversely, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has 
upheld Cruikshank on the ground that lower courts are disallowed from overruling 
Supreme Court decisions.  See NRA of Am., Inc. v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 858 
(7th Cir. 2009).  This further evinces the confusion among courts on the issue. 
 12 Frederic M. Bloom, State Courts Unbound, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 501, 504 n.16 
(2008). 
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Court itself would not follow it.
13
  In 1989, however, the Supreme 
Court flatly denied lower federal courts the right to anticipatorily 
overrule Supreme Court precedent.
14
  The Court in Rodriguez stated 
that “the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly con-
trols, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own deci-
sions.”15  Although this holding prevented lower federal courts from 
disregarding arguably dead Supreme Court precedent, that a state 
court is similarly limited does not necessarily follow. 
This Comment purposefully avoids addressing the issues of 
Second Amendment rights and the incorporation of the Second 
Amendment.  Instead, it seeks to establish that a state court has the 
power to disregard Supreme Court precedent in limited circums-
tances where a compelling argument demonstrates that the 
precedent is dead because of more recent, conflicting decisions 
handed down by the Court.  Specifically, this Comment argues that 
state courts may disregard precedent set forth in Cruikshank because 
of the irrelevance of its outdated incorporation analysis.  This propo-
sition has been recently bolstered by the Heller decision, which casts 
further doubt upon the validity of Cruikshank.  But this line of reason-
ing is not limited to Heller; state courts should in all instances consid-
er the continuing relevance, or lack thereof, of all questionable Su-
preme Court precedent. 
Part II of this Comment sets forth the background information 
that supports the theory that state courts may disregard Supreme 
Court precedent when that precedent has been undermined by the 
Court.  It begins by briefly introducing the legal theories of anticipa-
tory overruling and unbound state courts, sets forth and generally 
analyzes the changes that have occurred during the development of 
 
 13 Steven Bradford, Following Dead Precedent: The Supreme Court’s Ill-Advised Rejection 
of Anticipatory Overruling, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 39, 41 (1990).  One’s position concern-
ing anticipatory overruling is a reflection of one’s view of the hierarchy of the courts.  
Proponents of anticipatory overruling argue that courts should recognize when Su-
preme Court precedent is dead independent of whether the Supreme Court has ac-
knowledged the death, whereas opponents of anticipatory overruling argue that low-
er courts must follow Supreme Court precedent until the Court itself overrules it.  See 
id. at 40–41.  Proponents essentially argue that courts should not be bound by 
precedent that the Court itself would not follow; opponents argue the firmness of 
stare decisis and the continuing validity of Supreme Court precedent that has not 
been overruled.  See id. at 43–44. 
 14 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484–85 
(1989); see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237–38 (1997) (following Rodriguez 
and holding that the federal trial court was correct to wait for the Court to reinterp-
ret questionable precedent). 
 15 Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 484. 
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these theories, and finally states where these theories stand today.  In 
Part III, this Comment details the theory of anticipatory overruling 
and how the theory may better support a state court’s ability, rather 
than a federal court’s ability, to disregard dead precedent.  Part IV 
explains the theory of unbound state courts and presents several cas-
es illustrating the point that state courts should indeed be unbound.  
Part V introduces and analyzes Roper v. Simmons, in which the erosive 
impact on precedent is remarkably similar to that which is found in 
Heller.  Then, Part VI, by comparing the conflict between Heller and 
Cruikshank to Roper, supports a state court’s right to find Supreme 
Court precedent dead.  Part VII illustrates when a state court may 
properly exercise this right and specifically demonstrates that a state 
court may correctly disregard Cruikshank as dead precedent.  Finally, 
Part VIII discusses both the relevant factors of erosion and the stan-
dard a state court should apply to those factors and then applies 
those factors and that standard to Cruikshank. 
II. THE HISTORY OF COURTS DISREGARDING SUPREME COURT 
PRECEDENT 
Disregarding Supreme Court precedent is not a new proposal, 
and stare decisis is not absolute.
16
  In fact, the Supreme Court’s own 
treatment of stare decisis creates the confusion that leads a lower fed-
eral or state court to disregard Supreme Court precedent.
17
  Where 
the Supreme Court issues an opinion that may undermine standing 
precedent, a lower federal or state court is faced with the decision of 
whether to follow the older precedent at the risk of rejecting the 
newer precedent or to follow the newer precedent at the risk of dis-
regarding the older precedent.
18
  The question raised is which course 




 16 The Court does not hold that stare decisis bars the overruling of precedent; 
rather, it considers the policies promoted by stare decisis before overruling.  See Mo-
ragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970) (holding that courts must 
consider that law should (1) be a clear guide for conduct, (2) promote predictability 
and fairness in the law by reducing the need to relitigate like issues, and (3) maintain 
faith in the judiciary).  See generally David C. Bratz, Stare Decisis in Lower Courts: Predict-
ing the Demise of Supreme Court Precedent, 60 WASH. L. REV. 87, 90 (1984) (stating that 
stare decisis promotes (1) certainty in the law’s application, (2) fairness and efficien-
cy in the legal system, and (3) maintenance of confidence in the judicial process). 
 17 See Bradford, supra note 13, at 40. 
 18 See id. 
 19 See id. 
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Prior to 1989, numerous scholars considered a federal court’s 
ability to anticipatorily overrule the Supreme Court.
20
  The Court’s 
assertion in Rodriguez, however, that a lower federal court may not 
overrule the Supreme Court put an end to much of this debate.
21
  Cu-
riously, the Court did not provide much explanation for its rejection 
of a lower federal court’s right to anticipatorily overrule Supreme 
Court precedent, nor did it concern itself with the rights of state 
courts.
22
  Both prior to and following Rodriquez, the Court never made 
a similar assertion regarding state courts.
23
  As recently as 2005, in Ro-
per v. Simmons, the Supreme Court reviewed a state court’s holding 
that defied the Court’s precedent without mentioning the state 
court’s ability to disregard Supreme Court precedent.24  Thus, Roper 
lends support to the theory that state courts have been effectively un-
bound by the Supreme Court and may disregard outdated 
precedent.
25
  The “unbound state court” concept, proposed by Fre-
deric Bloom, essentially states that, for better or for worse, the Su-
preme Court permits state courts to disregard Supreme Court 
precedent by making that precedent uncertain and establishing a de-
ferential habeas standard.
26
  The unbound-state-court concept, how-




The change in theory from anticipatory overruling to unbound 
state courts is likely the result of the Supreme Court’s rejection of a 
lower federal court’s ability to disregard binding precedent.  The 
 
 20 See Bloom, supra note 12, at 504 n.16. 
 21 See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484–85 
(1989). 
 22 See id. (referencing only the Court of Appeals).  Both the majority and the dis-
sent in Rodriguez simply dismissed the right of a federal court to anticipatorily over-
rule.  Justice Stevens, in his dissent, cited this as a “duty of other federal courts to re-
spect our work product.”  Id. at 486 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  This specific language 
binding other federal courts, rather than all courts, may suggest a difference between 
lower federal and state courts when interpreting precedent. 
 23 See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. 
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 24 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 559–60. 
 25 See generally Bloom, supra note 12, at 509–10 (discussing the theory of unbound 
state courts). 
 26 Id. at 512. 
 27 See Jason Mazzone, When the Supreme Court Is Not Supreme 20 (Brooklyn Law Sch. 
Legal Studies, Paper No. 131, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1348593 (arguing that many circumstances allow state courts 
to make Constitutional interpretations “with little or no likelihood of review by the 
Supreme Court”). 
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newer unbound-state-court theory, however, sets itself apart from the 
theory of anticipatory overruling by focusing on the mechanics of 
how a state court is unbound by the Supreme Court rather than ap-
plying to state courts the rationale behind anticipatory overruling. 
The unbound-state-court theory is a descriptive, rather than a norma-
tive, account of a state court’s ability to disregard precedent.28  This 
Comment seeks to apply the rationale of anticipatory overruling to 
state, rather than federal, courts not simply to establish how the Su-
preme Court allows state courts to be unbound but both to demon-
strate that state courts have the power to disregard Supreme Court 
precedent and to detail when and how state courts should exercise 
this power. 
III. ANTICIPATORY OVERRULING SUPPORTS A STATE COURT’S ABILITY 
TO DISREGARD DEAD PRECEDENT 
For obvious reasons, the theory of anticipatory overruling raises 
questions regarding the role of a federal court that are particularly 
related to stare decisis.  This theory essentially weighs the benefits of 
strict adherence to stare decisis and respect for the Supreme Court 
against the interests of individual justice and making the law more 
responsive to change.
29
  The considerations that likely led the Su-
preme Court to deny lower federal courts the right to anticipatorily 
overrule Supreme Court precedent are more serious at the federal 
level than at the state level; state courts, therefore, should not be si-
milarly limited in their ability to disregard dead law. 
A. Duty to Obey 
Anticipatory overruling suggests that a court is under a duty to 
anticipate what the Supreme Court would hold rather than to blindly 
follow the precedent.
30
  Courts are expected, if not required, to apply 
the most current and applicable rule of law to the case before it.
31
  
Anticipatory overruling, however, is not a way to simply disobey the 
 
 28 See id. 
 29 See Margaret N. Kniffin, Overruling Supreme Court Precedents: Anticipatory Action by 
United States Courts of Appeals, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 53, 74–85 (1982). 
 30 Id. at 74. 
 31 Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974) (stating that “a court is to apply 
the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in 
manifest injustice”); United States v. Havener, 905 F.2d 3, 5 (1st Cir. 1990) (“One 
principle of statutory interpretation urges an appellate court to assume that a . . . 
new law . . . appl[ies] to cases on appeal, even if the new law leads to a different out-
come.”).  This assumption is implicit in the concept of stare decisis.  See 1-6 Federal 
Standards of Review (MB) § 6.01 (2008). 
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Court; rather, it is premised upon the idea that the newer law may in 
fact be what the Court would deem the applicable rule of law.  The 
supervisory nature of the Supreme Court over lower federal courts 
may justify the Supreme Court’s rejection of the lower federal courts’ 
ability to overrule the Court’s precedent.  Basic notions of federalism, 
however, refute the belief that the Supreme Court has the same su-
pervisory power over state courts.
32
  In fact, the Supreme Court expli-
citly accepts that it holds no general supervisory power over the state 
courts.
33
  Thus, the Court’s lack of similar supervisory power over 
state courts results in a lessened interest, or perhaps even lack of abil-
ity, to similarly deny this right to state courts. 
Furthermore, a state court serves a different master than a fed-
eral court does.  Although state law is limited insofar as it must not 
conflict with federal law, a state court is a creature of the state, and its 
principal duties and obligations lie with the state.
34
  Also, a state 
court’s decision does not bind the federal government but generally 
would bind the government of that particular state.
35
  The difference 
between state and federal courts is significant in this regard.  A state 
court should have much less of a duty to obey arguably dead Su-
preme Court precedent that it finds to be irrelevant because the 
forced following of dead law may injure the state or its citizenry.  If a 
state follows outdated precedent, it runs the risk of enforcing invalid 
laws and offending individual rights.  For example, it could lead to 
the infringement of individual Second Amendment rights due to an 
inability to disregard the outdated holding of Cruikshank.  If a state 
legislature agrees with Cruikshank that the Second Amendment does 
not apply to the states and decides to pass laws that are offensive to 
the Second Amendment, then the state courts, if bound by the out-
dated holding of Cruikshank, will have no recourse to defend the state 
citizenry’s Second Amendment rights.  Moreover, if state courts are 
forced to follow dead Supreme Court precedent, then the govern-
 
 32 Federal courts are Article III courts, which are inferior to the Supreme Court.  
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  On the other hand, state courts are creatures of the 
states in which they are established and bound by the federal courts only insofar as 
state law may not contradict federal law.  See U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 33 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 438 (2000) (“It is beyond dispute that 
we do not hold a supervisory power over the courts of the several States.”). 
 34 Although a state court’s duty is to interpret the law of the state, it must also re-
spect federal law that is on point; federal law is still the supreme law of the land.  See 
U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 35 Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 361 (1952) 
(“State laws are not controlling in determining what the incidents of this federal 
right shall be.”). 
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ments of the several states will be left with little to no recourse to cor-
rect any dead rule of law until the Supreme Court decides to explicit-
ly overrule itself; a single state’s legislature and executive branch have 
little control over federal law even where such law has a direct impact 
on the state.  The federal government is not similarly situated be-
cause it has the ability to effectively overrule law by either passing sta-
tutes that supersede judicial decisions or even amending the Consti-
tution.
36
  This is evident in the aggressive congressional reaction to 
Supreme Court decisions during and following the Civil Rights 
Movement where Congress legislatively overrode Supreme Court de-
cisions that were repugnant to Congress’s view of civil rights.37 
Moreover, Congress has provided to the federal courts statutory 
tools by which they may deal with precedential ambiguities and dead 
law even in the absence of the right to anticipatorily overrule Su-
preme Court precedent; state courts are not afforded similar tools.  
For example, a federal district judge may certify an order for appeal 
to the court of appeals where the issue “involves a controlling ques-
tion of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of 
opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially 
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.”38  In addition, a 
federal appellate court may certify a question of law to the Supreme 
Court.
39
  The combination of these two statutory options eliminates 
the need for any lower federal court to anticipatorily overrule Su-
preme Court precedent because the lower federal courts have a 
means by which to send the issue to the Supreme Court.  No similar 
tool exists in the state courts.  Consequently, a state court must rule 
on the issue and is faced with the decision of whether to follow the 
dead law.
40
  Because state courts may not avoid dead law like lower 
federal courts can, state courts should be afforded the ability to dis-
regard dead precedent where justice so requires. 
  
 
 36 See U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 37 See generally William N. Eskridge Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the 
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613, 624–41 (1991) (detail-
ing civil rights related legislative overrides of Supreme Court decisions from 1972 
through 1990). 
 38 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006). 
 39 Id. § 1254(2).  The Supreme Court, however, has discouraged such upward 
certification and stated that certification in this regard should be reserved for rare 
instances.  See Wisniewski v. United States, 353 U.S. 901, 902 (1957). 
 40 The district court, however, may not dodge the issue entirely; the issue must be 
certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  Nevertheless, the district court does have a 
means by which to push the issue upward for review. 
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B. Duty to Promote Justice 
Perhaps the most convincing argument in favor of anticipatory 
overruling is a court’s duty to promote justice.41  At both the federal 
and state level, a judge’s application of precedent that may be per-
ceived to be outdated would be inherently unjust.
42
  Even though 
judges might be opposed to binding precedent, they are nevertheless 
bound by that precedent.  No judge, however, should be bound by 
law that is unconvincing in the face of newer law.  To be bound by 
the older law would be to undermine the justice sought by the appli-
cation or creation of a newer law.  For example, ignoring in the name 
of stare decisis a 2008 Supreme Court holding that undermines a 
1908 Supreme Court holding would defeat both the modern progres-
sion of the law and the justice sought by the newer decision. 
C. The Need for Uniformity 
While perhaps disregarding the need for individual justice in 
specific cases, the concept of stare decisis promotes and strives to 
achieve uniformity among judicial decisions.
43
  A stable judicial system 
demands respect for stare decisis; “longstanding doctrine dictates 
that a court is always bound to follow a precedent established by a 
court ‘superior’ to it.”44  To provide stability in the law, courts must 
respect precedent.
45
  At the federal level, a strong argument can be 
made that federal courts should strictly adhere to stare decisis.  
Where a federal court strays from precedent, the predictability of the 
law is questioned and so is the respect for decisions of the Supreme 
Court.
46
  But the lack of uniformity that already exists at the Supreme 
Court level often gives rise to a lower federal or state court’s desire to 
disregard precedent.  For example, in regard to Heller and Cruikshank, 
courts may be tempted to disregard the precedent set forth by the 
Court in Cruikshank because of the Court’s language in Heller that 
 
 41 Kniffin, supra note 29, at 75. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 80–85. 
 44 Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 
STAN. L. REV. 817, 818 (1994). 
 45 See, e.g., CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1961 (2008) (“Prin-
ciples of stare decisis, after all, demand respect for precedent . . . .  Were that not so, 
those principles would fail to achieve the legal stability that they seek and upon 
which the rule of law depends.”). 
 46 See id. 
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seemingly undermines Cruikshank.
47
  Such lack of uniformity in the 
Court’s decisions creates the need for state courts to essentially 
choose which line of reasoning to follow. 
Further, the uniformity argument weakens when applied to the 
states as opposed to the federal government.  Historically, the states 
have been regarded as laboratories for new ideas and have been en-
couraged to experiment.
48
  Admittedly, the Heller and Cruikshank cases 
are concerned with federal, not state, law.
49
  Therefore, the question 
arises whether the states-as-laboratories theory can be extended to a 
state court’s interpretation of federal law.50 
The states-as-laboratories theory is perhaps most effective in 
areas that are traditionally state responsibilities, such as health care 
and crime.
51
  Where federal law, however, is in a state of uncertain-
ty—such as where federal precedent has been eroded—the underly-
ing concept of the states-as-laboratories theory supports the notion 
that state courts should have the ability to disregard precedent where 
the Supreme Court itself has created the uncertainty, especially with 
regard to interpretation of the Second Amendment, which directly 
affects both serious crime and gun control.
52
  On occasion, the Su-
preme Court itself creates uncertainty in an area of law by issuing 
conflicting holdings.  Providing state courts the ability via the states-
as-laboratories theory to disregard one precedent during the period 
of time that the Court has not finalized the issue by explicitly overrul-
ing either of the conflicting precedents may benefit both the Court 




 47 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 n.23 (2008) (stating 
that Cruikshank did not undergo a modern incorporation analysis); United States v. 
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876) (holding that the Second Amendment is not 
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and is therefore not applicable to the 
States). 
 48 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (describing states as laboratories). 
 49 The cases concern the Second Amendment.  Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2788; Cruik-
shank, 92 U.S. at 553. 
 50 Indeed, Jason Mazzone argues that early state courts freely applied the Bill of 
Rights to state action.  Jason Mazzone, The Bill of Rights in the Early State Cases, 92 
MINN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007). 
 51 David C. Mangan, Note, Gonzales v. Raich: The “States as Laboratories” Principle 
of Federalism Supports Prolonging California’s Experiment, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 521, 543 
(2007). 
 52 See generally id. at 543–44 (noting the advantages of using states as laboratories 
in areas such as crime). 
 53 Cf. Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme 
Court’s Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 699, 716 (1984) (dis-
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Where subsequent Supreme Court decisions erode the validity of 
prior decisions, uniformity is already offended.  The lower federal 
courts and state courts are not asked whether to follow uniformity; 
they are faced with the issue of how to deal with the pre-existing lack 
of uniformity that surrounds the issue at hand.  For example, with re-
gard to incorporation, a lower federal or state court is faced with the 
decision of whether to follow Cruikshank’s perhaps outdated holding 
that the Second Amendment is not incorporated
54
 or to follow Heller’s 
declaration that the modern incorporation doctrine set forth in Dun-
can v. Louisiana
55
 is required in all cases.
56
  The courts are asked 
whether it is worse to disregard reasoning set forth within a modern 
decision than to dismiss the holding of an older, perhaps eroded, de-
cision.  Indeed, a state or federal court could do great harm to the in-
stitutions of justice by following dead precedent.
57
 
The Court has expressed its concern about the dangers of lower 
federal courts anticipatorily overruling Supreme Court precedent 
and has stated that lower federal courts may not do so.
58
  Notions of 
federalism and the understanding of the states as laboratories for 
changing ideas, however, may undermine the uniformity argument as 
it applies to state courts.
59
  Having advanced the argument that the 
theory of anticipatory overruling strongly supports a state court’s abil-
ity to disregard dead precedent, this Comment continues to consider 
how state courts remain, in many circumstances, free to do so. 
IV. STATE COURT HISTORY OF DISREGARDING DEAD PRECEDENT 
Although it appears to be a commonly held assumption that the 
Supreme Court is never challenged by other courts, lower federal and 
state court expressions of willingness to overrule Supreme Court 
precedent do, though perhaps uncommonly, occur.
60
  In fact, state 
 
cussing the theory of percolation and the importance of allowing courts to indepen-
dently decide issues before the Supreme Court rules on the issue). 
 54 Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553. 
 55 391 U.S. 145, 164, 171 (1968). 
 56 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2813 n.23 (2008). 
 57 See infra Part IV.B. 
 58 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484–85 
(1989). 
 59  See generally Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (providing a thorough 
discussion of federalism and dual sovereignty). 
 60 See Bradford, supra note 13, at 43 n.19. 
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courts have disregarded Supreme Court precedent in several land-
mark cases as recently as 2007.
61
 
A. The Theory of Unbound State Courts Coupled with the Concept of 
Anticipatory Overruling 
Although a state court’s decision to disregard Supreme Court 
precedent may simply be deemed a misinterpretation of the law on 
review by the Court, it sometimes succeeds.
62
  This success has been 
explained by the theory of unbound state courts.
63
  The theory in its 
basic form states that the Supreme Court has given some of its inter-
pretive authority to the states through an unbinding process.
64
  This 
unbinding process has two steps: first the Court creates uncertainty in 
the law, and then the deferential habeas standard shields even incor-
rect rulings.
65
  Frederic Bloom analyzes unbound state courts in the 
context of habeas review,
66
 but habeas review is only one of many 
areas in which state courts may avoid review by the Supreme Court.
67
  
For example, Jason Mazzone cites to several circumstances that allow 
for state authority on matters of Constitutional interpretation that the 
Supreme Court is unlikely to review, including (1) “rules of preclu-
sion”; (2) “the role of state courts in adjudicating criminal cases”; 
and (3) “the possibility of state decisions flying below the radar.”68 
This unbound-state-court theory is interesting in several regards.  
First, it approaches a state court’s ability to disregard Supreme Court 
precedent in a much different manner than the way in which the an-
ticipatory-overruling theory interpreted the right of lower federal 
courts to do the same.  The desire to set the unbound-court theory 
apart from the anticipatory-overruling theory may be attributed, at 
least in part, to the Supreme Court’s denial of a lower federal court’s 
right to anticipatorily overrule Supreme Court precedent.
69
  This is 
 
 61 See generally Smith v. Texas, 550 U.S. 297 (2007); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551 (2005); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). 
 62 See generally Roper, 543 U.S. 551. 
 63 See generally Bloom, supra note 12 (explaining the mechanics of the unbound 
state theory). 
 64 Id. at 506. 
 65 Id. at 512. 
 66 See generally Bloom, supra note 12. 
 67 Mazzone, supra note 27, at 20. 
 68 Id. 
 69 See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484–85 
(1989) (holding that the Court of Appeals should leave the prerogative of overruling 
Supreme Court decisions to the Supreme Court). 
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doubtlessly a valid concern, but the unbound-state-court theory does 
not acknowledge the validity of the arguments in support of anticipa-
tory overruling as they relate to state courts.  Second, the unbound-
state-court theory is a descriptive, rather than a normative, explana-
tion of the unbinding process.
70
  It thoroughly analyzes the way in 
which the Supreme Court has unbound state courts but does not 
provide the same thorough analysis of a state court’s interest in being 
unbound.
71
  For these reasons, this Comment accepts the theory of 
unbound state courts but expands upon it by applying the underlying 
themes of anticipatory overruling to state courts.  As a result, cases of 
lower federal courts engaging in anticipatory overruling as well as ar-
guments generally in favor of anticipatory overruling provide support 
for a state court’s right to disregard dead Supreme Court precedent. 
B. The Dangers of Denying the Right to Disregard Dead Precedent 
Illustrated 
If a court is bound by arguably dead precedent, new holdings 
will be effectively infertile until the Supreme Court expressly over-
rules the older precedent.  But modern, emerging rules of law that 
clearly undermine precedent should not be overlooked in the name 
of stare decisis.  Two particular instances in the Court’s history may 




1. Brown and Plessy: The Civil Rights Movement 
In 1954 the Supreme Court issued an opinion in Brown v. Board 
of Education
73
 that many regard to be its most crowning achievement; 
the Supreme Court rejected the separate-but-equal doctrine and held 
public-school racial segregation to be unconstitutional.
74
  The lan-
guage of Brown, however, rejected the separate-but-equal doctrine on-
ly as it applied to public education.
75
  Prior to that decision, the Su-
preme Court established in Plessy v. Ferguson
76
 that public-
transportation segregation was constitutionally permitted.  Following 
 
 70 Bloom, supra note 12, at 502 (noting that “the Court willingly permits state 
courts to disregard Supreme Court precedent”). 
 71 Id. at 548–50. 
 72 See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 73 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 74 Id. at 495. 
 75 Id. 
 76 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896). 
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Brown, the separate-but-equal doctrine was on shaky ground at best, 
but Plessy had not been explicitly overruled. 
Under the Rodriguez view, lower federal courts would still have 
been bound by Plessy until it was explicitly overruled;
77
 however, this 
was not the case.  Lower federal courts actively anticipatorily over-
ruled Plessy, and the Supreme Court affirmed the anticipatory over-
rulings in per curiam decisions.
78
  In fact, in Dawson v. Baltimore City,
79
 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit noted that the au-
thority of segregation cases like Plessy had been “swept away by the 
subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court.”80  Indeed, the Supreme 
Court affirmed this holding with no criticism of the lower federal 
court’s decision to disregard the precedent.81 
Aside from illustrating that the Supreme Court did not criticize 
the lower federal courts for dismissing Plessy as dead law, a greater 
lesson may be learned: the anticipatory overrulings played a consi-
derable, if not vital, role in the progression of the civil-rights move-
ment in the American judicial system.  The Supreme Court affirmed 
the anticipatory overrulings of Plessy but only insofar as the courts be-
low addressed the issue.  For example, through Supreme Court af-
firmances of lower federal court anticipatory overrulings, the sepa-
rate-but-equal doctrine was found to be inapplicable to beaches, then 
buses, and then public parks.
82
  Had the lower federal courts not 
chipped away at Plessy, the civil rights movement arguably might have 
suffered.  In fact, not until 1967, thirteen years after Brown, did the 
Supreme Court clearly state that “equal application does not immun-
ize [a] statute from the very heavy burden of justification . . . required 
of state statutes drawn according to race.”83  In this setting, the possi-
ble implications of the federal courts failing to anticipatorily overrule 
 
 77 See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484–85 
(1989) (holding that the Court of Appeals should leave the prerogative of overruling 
Supreme Court decisions to the Supreme Court). 
 78 See, e.g., New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n v. Detiege, 252 F.2d 122, 
123 (5th Cir. 1958), aff’d, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per curiam); Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. 
Supp. 707, 717 (D. Ala. 1956), aff’d, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam). 
 79 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877, 877 (1955) (per curiam). 
 82 See, e.g., New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54, 54 
(1958) (per curiam) (public parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903, 903 (1956) (per 
curiam) (buses); Dawson, 350 U.S. at 877 (per curiam) (beaches). 
 83 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967). 
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Plessy are frightening: minorities would have had to wait as long as 
thirteen years after Brown to receive the relief that they deserved.
84
 
2. Barnette v. West Virginia State Board of Education
85
: A 
Strong Argument for Disregarding Dead Precedent 
Barnette involved the enforcement of a regulation that required 
students to salute the flag.
86
  This requirement was challenged as a vi-
olation of the students’ religious liberty as protected by the First 
Amendment, which is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
87
  Prior to Barnette, the Court held in Minersville School 
District v. Gobitis
88
  that such a regulation did not offend the Constitu-
tion.
89
  The district court in Barnette, however, found that the Su-
preme Court had since undermined Gobitis as precedential authori-
ty.
90
  The court expressed that it would ordinarily “feel constrained to 
follow an unreversed decision of the Supreme Court of the United 
States” regardless of whether it agreed with the Court but that recent 
developments illustrated that the Court itself had impaired that au-
thority.
91
  Specifically, the court held that it “would be recreant to our 
duty as judges . . . [to] blind[ly] follow[ ] a decision which the Su-
preme Court itself has thus impaired as an authority.”92  On that basis, 
the court disregarded Gobitis as dead precedent.
93
 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Barnette decision and did not 
deny the lower court’s strong language supporting the ability to dis-
regard the questioned precedent.
94
  This illustrates that anticipatory 
overruling has benefitted the judicial process where the Court’s sub-
sequent decisions have eroded precedent. 
 
 84 See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text. 
 85 47 F. Supp. 251 (S.D. W. Va. 1942), aff’d, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 86 Id. at 252. 
 87 Id. 
 88 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624 (1943). 
 89 Id. at 599–600. 
 90 Barnette, 47 F. Supp. at 252–53 (noting that members of the Court referred to 
Gobitis as “public expression . . . that it is unsound” and noting the Court’s decision 
to avoid it as precedential authority in a subsequent related case). 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 253. 
 93 See id. 
 94 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 643 (1943). 
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V. ROPER V. SIMMONS
95
: A MODERN EXAMPLE OF A STATE COURT’S 
RIGHT TO DISREGARD SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
Prior to Roper, the Supreme Court held in Stanford v. Kentucky
96
 
that the Constitution does not prohibit the execution of minors.
97
  
Simmons, at seventeen years of age, committed a murder.
98
  His guilt 
was not questioned; he even bragged that he could get away with the 
murder because he was a minor.
99
  Simmons was tried as an adult and 
the State successfully sought the death penalty.
100
  The Missouri Su-
preme Court affirmed the death sentence.
101
  Subsequently, in Atkins 
v. Virginia,
102
 the Supreme Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments prohibited the execution of mentally retarded per-
sons.
103
  Following the Atkins decision, Simmons filed for state relief, 
and the Missouri Supreme Court granted it.
104
  The court held that 
a national consensus has developed against the execution of juve-
nile offenders, as demonstrated by the fact that eighteen states 
now bar such executions for juveniles, that twelve other states bar 
executions altogether, that no state has lowered its age of execu-
tion below 18 since Stanford, that five states have legislatively or by 
case law raised or established the minimum age at 18, and that 
the imposition of the juvenile death penalty has become truly un-
usual over the last decade.
105
 




The Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the state court with 
no criticism of the state court’s decision to disregard the Court’s 
precedent, even though the dissent in the state court’s decision, 
quoting Rodriguez, explicitly argued against the state court’s right to 
 
 95 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 96 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 97 Id. at 380. 
 98 Roper, 543 U.S. at 556. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 557–58. 
 101 Id. at 559. 
 102 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 103 Id. at 321. 
 104 See State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 413 (Mo. 2003), aff’d, 543 
U.S. 551. 
 105 Id. at 399. 
 106 Id. at 400. 
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make such a decision.
107
  And even though the parties presented the 
issue to the Court,
108
 no discussion was provided as to either a state 
court’s right to interpret the constitution or anticipatorily overrule 
the Court.
109
  Instead, in reaching its affirmance, the Court consi-
dered and analyzed state trends regarding the Eighth Amendment 
and the execution of both the mentally retarded and juveniles.
110
 
VI. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER
111
 AND THE POWER TO HOLD THAT 
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT IS DEAD 
A. History: United States v. Cruikshank
112
 
Cruikshank was heard during the horrors of a nation influenced 
by the Ku Klux Klan. The case concerned what has been remembered 
as the Colfax Massacre, during which a group of whites banded to-
gether and killed a large group of blacks on Easter Sunday by burn-
ing down the building in which they had assembled and shooting 
those who tried to escape.
113
  Several counts were brought against the 
conspirators, including conspiracy to hinder persons’ right to assem-
ble and their right to bear arms.
114
  The Supreme Court dismissed the 
indictment and held that because neither the First nor Second 
Amendments were incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, 
those Amendments only protected against federal action.
115
 
This holding is plainly outdated because it found the First 
Amendment to be unincorporated.
116
  Furthermore, Cruikshank “did 
not engage in the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required 
 
 107 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005); Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 421 
(Price, J., dissenting). 
 108 Brief for Petitioner at 11, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) (arguing that a state 
court may not overrule Supreme Court precedent no matter how antiquated or ques-
tionable the ruling may be). 
 109 Roper, 543 U.S. at 560. 
 110 Id. at 565–67. 
 111 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
 112 92 U.S. 542 (1876). 
 113 Timothy Sandefur, Can You Get There from Here?: How the Law Still Threatens 
King’s Dream, 22 LAW & INEQ. 1, 12 (2004); Frederick M. Lawrence, Civil Rights and 
Criminal Wrongs: The Mens Rea of Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2113, 
2151–52 (1993).  See generally CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED: THE COLFAX 
MASSACRE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUCTION (2008). 
 114 Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 551–53. 
 115 Id. at 551–54. 
 116 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2813 n.23 (2008). 
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by . . . later cases.”117  The Duncan case quite clearly illustrates the dif-
ference between a modern incorporation analysis and incorporation 
analyses undertaken by the Court prior to Duncan: “Earlier the Court 
can be seen as having asked, when inquiring into whether some par-
ticular procedural safeguard was required of a State, if a civilized sys-
tem could be imagined that would not accord the particular protec-
tion.”118  Subsequent to Duncan, the Court asks if a protection is 
“necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty.”119  Dun-
can essentially discredits the Palko method of incorporation, which 
required courts to use the “civilized system” method.120  But Cruik-
shank did not even conduct a Palko analysis; it applied the Slaughter-
House reasoning by conducting a privileges-and-immunities analysis 
rather than a due process analysis.
121
  Essentially, Cruikshank is two 
steps removed from modern incorporation.  This creates a strong 
probability that the precedential value of Cruikshank is questionable. 
B. District of Columbia v. Heller
122
 
Heller challenged a handgun prohibition in the District of Co-
lumbia on the basis that it was an infringement of his Second 
Amendment right to bear arms.
123
  The Supreme Court interpreted 
the Second Amendment to protect an individual’s “inherent right of 
self-defense.”124  Although the Supreme Court found that an individ-
ual’s right to bear arms may not be infringed by the federal govern-
ment, it noted that the question of incorporation was not presented 
in Heller.
125
  The Court, however, went on to note that Cruikshank simi-
larly held the First Amendment to be unincorporated and did not 
engage in a modern incorporation analysis.
126
 
Insofar as incorporation of the Second Amendment is con-
cerned, the language in Heller creates confusion by commenting that 
Cruikshank did not undertake the required modern incorporation 
 
 117 Id. 
 118 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968). 
 119 Id. at 150 n.14. 
 120 Id.; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937). 
 121 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876) (stating that the Second 
Amendment only applies to Congress); see generally Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 
(1873) (conducting a privileges-and-immunities analysis). 
 122 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
 123 Id. at 2788. 
 124 Id. at 2818. 
 125 Id. at 2813 n.23. 
 126 Id. 
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analysis yet not overruling Cruikshank.
127
  Heller sets forth reasons why 
precedent, such as Cruikshank, which holds the Second Amendment 
to be unincorporated, is questionable.
128
  State courts are left to de-
cide whether they should defer to Supreme Court precedent that the 
Court itself has questioned or, alternatively, disregard precedent that 
the Supreme Court explicitly decided not to overrule. 
C. A Comparison of Roper v. Simmons
129
 with the State 
Incorporation Issue Raised by Heller 
Roper and Heller are comparable in several regards.  First, the 
cases are only three years apart; Roper was decided in 2005 and Heller 
in 2008.  The proximity in time between the cases likely leads to a 
reasonably certain conclusion that the Supreme Court would treat 
the cases similarly if they raise similar issues.  The less time between 
cases, the less likely it is that the Court will change its reasoning. 
Second, both cases concern the interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights: Roper concerns the Eighth Amendment, and Heller concerns 
the Second Amendment.
130
  This also may lead to an assumption that 
the two issues will be treated similarly.  Although the Heller issue may 
be further complicated by Fourteenth Amendment incorporation is-
sues, both cases concern the way in which a provision of the Bill of 
Rights will affect state law. 
Third, the judiciary is considered by many to be the champion of 
the minority and the protector of civil liberties because of its counter-
majoritarian role.
131
  Therefore, if this argument holds merit, the 
Court might be more likely to affirm a state’s expansion of the Bill of 
Rights than to affirm a restriction.  Notably, in Michigan v. Long,
132
 Jus-
tice Stevens stated in dissent that the Court should not review state 
court decisions in which the state “simply provided greater protection 
 
 127 Id. 
 128 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2812–16. 
 129 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 130 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2788; Roper, 543 U.S. at 559–60. 
 131 This view dates back to the Federalist Papers, in which Alexander Hamilton 
stated that “the independence of the judges may be an essential safeguard against 
the effects of occasional ill humors in the society.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 528 
(Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961).  This assumption, however, is not at all 
uncontested: Cruikshank and Dred Scott both exemplify the Court’s denial to protect 
minority rights in past decisions.  See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 
(1876); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
 132 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
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to one of its citizens than some other State might provide or, indeed, 
than this Court might require throughout the country.”133 
Fourth, both cases deal with state-court action.  Roper was a rul-
ing of a state court interpreting the Eighth Amendment;
134
 state 
courts following Heller will also tackle the incorporation issue. 
Fifth and finally, both cases concern precedent that is outdated 
and questioned by the Supreme Court.  In State ex rel. Simmons v. Ro-
per,
135
 the Missouri Supreme Court stated that “the rationale for the 
Supreme Court’s determination that the execution of juveniles was 
not cruel and unusual punishment has disappeared, and that the 
Eighth Amendment bars [a juvenile’s] execution.”136  The Supreme 
Court in Roper confirmed the Missouri Supreme Court’s reasoning by 
noting that a majority of states now reject the death penalty for mi-
nors and holding that such bans are required by the Eighth Amend-
ment.
137
  That finding in Roper was brought about by the state court’s 
rejection of Stanford, which held that the execution of a juvenile did 
not offend the Eighth Amendment, and the expansion of Atkins, 
which held the execution of mentally retarded persons to be offen-
sive to the Eighth Amendment.
138
  Similarly, state courts faced with 
the incorporation issue raised by Heller must decide whether to follow 
the outdated law and reasoning of Cruikshank or adopt principles set 





 133 Id. at 1068 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Mazzone, supra note 27, at 70–71 
(analyzing Justice Stevens’s position on Supreme Court review of state court deci-
sions that expand Constitutional protection). 
 134 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555–56 (2005). 
 135 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003), aff’d, 543 U.S. 551. 
 136 Id. at 399. 
 137 Roper, 543 U.S. at 568. 
 138 Id. at 555–56, 564; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002); Stanford v. Ken-
tucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989); see Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2649 
(2008) (stating that “the Court held in Roper and Atkins that the execution of juve-
niles and mentally retarded persons violates the Eighth Amendment because the of-
fender has a diminished personal responsibility for the crime”); see generally Bruce J. 
Winick, The Supreme Court’s Evolving Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Severe Mental Illness as 
the Next Frontier, 50 B.C. L. REV. 785 (2009) (detailing the diminished capaci-
ty/responsibility rule set forth by Atkins and Roper). 
 139 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2813 n.23 (2008) (noting 
that Cruikshank did not engage in the modern incorporation analysis that is required 
today).  Seemingly, if a state court were able to find Stanford, a 1989 case, to no long-
er be binding, then Cruikshank, an 1876 case, could just as easily be held by a state 
court to be dead law. 
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Although Roper and Heller have many common features, several 
distinct differences between the cases also exist.  First, the cases con-
cern different constitutional amendments—Roper concerns the Eight 
Amendment and Heller concerns the Second Amendment.  While 
both cases deal with the Bill of Rights, this does not automatically re-
sult in equal treatment.  For example, in Slocum v. New York Life Insur-
ance Co.,
140
 the Supreme Court held that the Seventh Amendment is 
not applicable to the states.
141
 
Also, a difference may exist in the degree to which the 
precedent in question has been damaged.  When Roper disregarded 
Stanford as precedential authority, the Atkins court had already deli-
vered what may be considered a fatal blow to Stanford’s holding.142  
Atkins was binding Supreme Court precedent that touched directly 
on the evolving standards of decency concerning cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
143
  Atkins found that the 
execution of the mentally retarded offended our standards of decen-
cy and easily made a case for questioning the execution of juveniles; 
Roper cited to the similarities of the two issues in stating that “[t]he 
evidence of national consensus against the death penalty for juveniles 
is similar, and in some respects parallel, to the evidence Atkins held 
sufficient to demonstrate a national consensus against the death pe-
nalty for the mentally retarded.”144 
On the other hand, the Heller holding did not contradict Cruik-
shank; it did not address the issue of incorporation.
145
  Furthermore, 
much of the language in Heller that may be read to discredit Cruik-
shank is mere footnote dicta.
146
  But notably, the dicta is indeed a po-
werful argument against Cruikshank because the dicta expressly states 
that the Cruikshank reasoning is outdated.
147
 
Despite the several distinctions between Heller and Roper, the 
cases are similar enough to be treated alike.  A supportable argument 
can be made that the Supreme Court would affirm a state court’s 
finding that Cruikshank is dead law and may therefore be disregarded 
just as the Court in Roper disregarded Stanford.  Furthermore, the 
 
 140 228 U.S. 364 (1913). 
 141 Id. at 376–77. 
 142 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005). 
 143 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002). 
 144 Roper, 543 U.S. at 564. 
 145 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2813 n.23 (2008). 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
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Court would affirm even if it found that the state court was wrong to 
anticipatorily overrule but was correct on the merits.  In both in-
stances, the state court is relying on Supreme Court precedent that 
undermined the analysis and holding in the questioned precedent.  
The cases both concern a state court’s interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights and the expansion of those respective rights.  Additionally, the 
cases are very close in time, which indicates that the Supreme Court 
may treat them similarly.
148
  Just as the Supreme Court did not take 
issue with Roper’s defiance of dead Supreme Court precedent, the 
Court is not likely to take issue with a state court disregarding Cruik-
shank on almost identical grounds.  But it does not necessarily follow 
that the Court will accept such reasoning.  The Court may overrule a 
state court’s interpretation of the Constitution,149 and it could find 
that Cruikshank still stands when applying a modern Fourteenth 
Amendment analysis.  The issue at hand, however, is not whether a 
state court’s interpretation will stand as constitutional law; the issue is 
whether the state court has the right to engage in the sort of analysis 
that allows the state court to decide whether arguably dead precedent 
may be disregarded.  The answer to this question seems to be in the 
affirmative. 
VII. THE STATE COURT STANDARD FOR DISREGARDING  
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
A state court should exercise its power to disregard Supreme 
Court precedent where (1) the precedent in question has been 
eroded by the Supreme Court itself, and (2) the state court is nearly 
certain that the Supreme Court would overrule the eroded law.  Say-
ing that a state court may disregard Supreme Court precedent is one 
thing, but saying that a state court should do so is quite another.  
Specifically, finding that a state court may disregard Cruikshank in 
light of Heller is not the end-all solution concerning whether a state 
court should take such action.  When deciding whether a state court 
should disregard Supreme Court precedent, a court should consider 
a culmination of factors, none of which is dispositive, and be nearly 
certain that those factors would lead the Supreme Court to overrule 
that precedent. 
 
 148 See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970) (stating that pre-
dictability of law is an important concept of stare decisis). 
 149 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 335 (1816) (holding that 
the Supreme Court may review state court decisions). 
WILSON (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/15/2010  12:38 PM 
2010] COMMENT 393 
A. Factors that Illustrate the Supreme Court’s Erosion of the Questioned 
Precedent 
Ultimately, the states are free to set their own standards concern-
ing whether the state courts should consider the precedent dead.  
But this Comment argues that when assessing the continued validity 
of Supreme Court precedent, state courts should limit their inquiry 
to Supreme Court action.  The specific factors set forth are mere ex-
amples of Supreme Court action that may be persuasive to state 
courts; they are not intended to be all inclusive.  The states may place 
more weight on certain factors than others and are in fact encour-
aged to do so.  For example, a state court would be wise to consider a 
holding to be more persuasive than dicta, but this is not to say that 
Supreme Court dicta may not erode a prior holding.  State courts are 
well equipped to balance the persuasiveness of these various factors 
in deciding whether Supreme Court precedent is dead. 
Undeniably, the most important factor in considering whether a 
court should disregard Supreme Court precedent is the status of that 
precedent.  A court must consider whether subsequent Supreme 
Court decisions have eroded the rule of law set forth by the case in 
question.
150
  A state court should look to the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion when deciding whether precedent has been eroded.
151
  Roper 
clearly supports this line of reasoning by holding Stanford insufficient 
in light Atkins’s holding.152 
Precedent may be eroded by subsequent holdings that are con-
trary to the rule in question.  For example, in Roper, the questioned 
precedent was undermined by the subsequent Atkins decision, which 
held, in direct conflict with the prior holding, the execution of the 
mentally retarded to be cruel and unusual punishment.
153
  Thus, the 
Atkins decision not only overruled the precedent that the mentally re-
tarded may be executed, but it also damaged and eroded precedent 
that held that the execution of minors did not offend the Eighth 
Amendment.
154
  Many of the arguments set forth in Atkins that over-
ruled the precedent allowing for the execution of the mentally re-
tarded also damaged the precedent allowing the execution of minors, 
 
 150 See Kniffin, supra note 29, at 53–54 (stating factors to be considered when de-
ciding whether to anticipatorily overrule Supreme Court precedent). 
 151 Cf. Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of In-
ferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 79 (1994) (discussing the consideration 
of dicta in court decision making). 
 152 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005). 
 153 Id. at 559. 
 154 Id. 
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such as the growing national consensus against the death penalty for 
both the mentally retarded and juveniles.
155
 
Another way that Supreme Court precedent may be eroded is 
through changing trends in Supreme Court decisions.  This may oc-
cur if a holding is grounded in a certain rule of law and the Supreme 
Court moves away from that rule of law.
156
  For example, in Spector Mo-
tor Service, Inc. v. Walsh,
157
 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit anticipatorily overruled the Court and noted that “perhaps 
most important of all, are the broad trends in favor of [a new doc-
trine] shown of late by the present Court.”158 
Although perhaps less persuasive, awareness that the Supreme 
Court is waiting to overrule the precedent may erode that 
precedent.
159
  This factor may be less persuasive than the previous fac-
tors because awareness that the Court seeks to overrule a precedent 
does not bind any court.  Nevertheless, a court may conclude that the 
Supreme Court’s desire to overrule sufficiently erodes the precedent 
in question.  The Supreme Court may have indicated that it is await-
ing a particular type of case to overrule the questioned precedent.
160
  
A court may properly interpret such action to be an invitation to find 
that precedent to be dead.
161
  On the other hand, a court may feel 
bound by the decision and compelled to await the Court’s decision to 
overrule that precedent.  Perhaps the best course of action would be 
for state courts to consider the Supreme Court’s desire to overrule as 
supplementary support for finding that precedent to be dead law.
162
  
State courts, however, should not disregard Supreme Court 
 
 155 Id. 
 156 Kniffin, supra note 29, at 63. 
 157 139 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1943). 
 158 Id. at 816. 
 159 Kniffin, supra note 29, at 65 (outlining the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit’s anticipatory overruling based on the prediction that the Supreme Court was 
awaiting the proper case to overrule the precedent in question). 
 160 See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 657 n.14 (1965) (holding 
that the decision did not overrule the precedent in controversy and that the Court 
would wait for a proper case in which to do so). 
 161 See, e.g., Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 441 F.2d 1222, 1224 (5th Cir. 
1971) (finding that the case before it was “precisely the case for which the Supreme 
Court [had] been waiting”), aff’d, 406 U.S. 320 (1972). 
 162 See Kniffin, supra note 29, at 66 (“In some instances . . . the likelihood of a par-
ticular Supreme Court action is used as a supporting factor after another reason for 
anticipatory overruling . . . .”). 
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precedent simply to force the Supreme Court to reconsider the issue 
where the Court has not indicated a desire to do so.
163
 
Similarly, Supreme Court dicta is not binding on any court but 
may be very persuasive in deciding whether the precedent in question 
is dead.
164
  A statement in dicta made by a Supreme Court majority 
that questions the validity of prior precedent sheds much light on the 
precedential value of that holding.  Related to that point, dissenting 
Supreme Court authority may perhaps to a lesser degree serve as 
supporting authority for finding questionable Supreme Court author-
ity to be dead. 
By way of example, in Saenz v. Roe,
165
 Justice Thomas, in his dis-
senting opinion, stated, “Because I believe that the demise of the Pri-
vileges or Immunities Clause has contributed in no small part to the 
current disarray of our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, I 
would be open to reevaluating its meaning in an appropriate case.”166  
A state court would be hard-pressed to hold that Justice Thomas’s wil-
lingness to reevaluate the Privileges or Immunities Clause alone suffi-
ciently erodes the validity of the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment ju-
risprudence.  But if Justice Thomas’s dissent were accompanied by a 
later change in the Court’s interpretation of the Privileges or Immun-
ities Clause, then perhaps a state court might find the dissent to be 
particularly persuasive.  Had Justice Thomas spoken for a unanimous 
Court, even if mere dicta, this statement would be far more persua-
sive, but it does not follow that a dissent can therefore never support 
a finding that precedent is dead.  The state courts must decide the 
persuasiveness of such factors. 
Not all Supreme Court activity, however, should be considered 
when deciding whether Supreme Court precedent is dead.  For ex-
ample, a change in the Court’s membership does not invite a state 
court to disregard otherwise valid precedent.  Such a practice has the 
potential to compromise the stability of the judicial system.
167
  A judi-
cial system where the precedential value of every Supreme Court de-
cision could be undermined and disregarded by any court in the 
 
 163 See Booster Lodge No. 405, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1143, 
1150 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (stating that a lower court’s “function” was not to overrule 
Supreme Court precedent to force reconsideration of the issue). 
 164 Commonwealth v. Reaves, 923 A.2d 1119, 1135 (Pa. 2007) (Baldwin, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that dicta serves to undermine precedent). 
 165 526 U.S. 489 (1999). 
 166 Id. at 527–28 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 167 But see Kniffin, supra note 29, at 67. 
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United States based on the current membership of the Court would 
prove disastrous to judicial stability. 
For example, if a Justice of the Supreme Court who took part in 
the majority opinion in Roe v. Wade
168
 retires and is replaced by a Jus-
tice who is of the opinion that it was wrongly decided—resulting in 
the erosion of the precedential value of that case and an invitation 
for state courts to disregard it as a precedential matter—the state 
courts would effectively be adjudging the precedential value of Roe v. 
Wade based simply on the number of Justices who signed off on the 
opinion.  The fact that the decision of a divided court is still binding 
precedent is well established.
169
  If the change in membership, howev-
er, were to be followed by a Supreme Court opinion, whether majori-
ty or dissent, that asserted the invalidity of Roe v. Wade, then an anal-
ogy could be made to Justice Thomas’s dissent discussed above, and 
such an opinion could perhaps serve as valid supplemental authority 
in a finding that Roe v. Wade is dead precedent.  But such authority 
would likely not be sufficient on its own.  In other words, the percep-
tion that the Court may now be more conservative than it once was 
should not entice a conservative state court to disregard Roe v. Wade.  
A state court must wait for the Court to take affirmative steps to erode 
the precedent.  Similarly, state courts should not disregard Supreme 
Court precedent simply to force the Supreme Court to reconsider the 
issue. 
A state court never has the duty or even the right to disregard 
otherwise binding Supreme Court precedent without Supreme Court 
action.  Rather than predict whether the Court will overrule the ques-
tioned precedent of its own volition, a state court should decide 
whether the Court has already taken steps that have eroded the hold-
ing of the questioned precedent.  In the judicial branch of govern-
ment, only Supreme Court precedent can undermine Supreme Court 
precedent; state courts may only derive the ability to disregard that 
precedent where the Supreme Court itself has called its precedential 
value into question. 
 
 168 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 169 See United States v. Girouard, 149 F.2d 760, 763 (1st Cir. 1945) (“It is true that 
these decisions were by a divided court but . . . we are bound to accept the law as 
promulgated by these decisions.”). 
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B. The Standard in Determining the Degree to Which the Supreme 
Court Has Eroded the Precedent in Question 
Once a court has recognized the proper factors to be consi-
dered, it must then weigh the persuasiveness of those factors and de-
cide whether those factors support a conclusion that the Supreme 
Court would overrule that precedent.  Courts have been torn when 
attempting to define the proper standard by which a court should 
find Supreme Court precedent dead.
170
  Notably, the federal cases 
that set forth the standards below all pre-date Rodriguez because that 
case rejected the concept of anticipatory overruling; consequently, 
lower federal courts were denied any right to disregard Supreme 
Court precedent after 1989.
171
 
1. Differing Standards Set Forth by Courts 
Three standards have been established by which courts have de-
cided whether the Supreme Court would overrule the precedent in 
question.  The most rigid, and this Comment argues the most proper, 
standard is the “near certainty” standard.  This standard reflects a 
fear of abuse by lower federal or state courts as well as a reverence for 
stare decisis.  A court applying this standard is hesitant to disregard 
Supreme Court precedent unless Supreme Court opinions “already 
delivered have created a near certainty that only the occasion is 
needed for pronouncement of the doom.”172 
Another standard set forth by courts is the “high probability” 
standard.  Invoking perhaps a less rigid standard, other courts have 
indicated that the correct analysis of whether disregarding Supreme 
Court precedent is proper turns on whether a high probability exists 
that the Court would overrule the decision in question.
173
  Other 
courts have used the terms “powerfully convinced,” “convinced,” or 





 170 See Bradford, supra note 13, at 45–46. 
 171 See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484–85 
(1989). 
 172 Salerno v. Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003, 1005 (2d Cir. 
1970); see also Olson v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 806 F.2d 731, 734 (7th 
Cir. 1986). 
 173 See, e.g., Levine v. Heffernan, 864 F.2d 457, 461 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 174 See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 868 F.2d 236, 241 (7th Cir. 1989) (“strong evi-
dence”); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1123 (7th Cir. 1987) (“powerfully 
convinced”); Indianapolis Airport Auth. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 733 F.2d 1262, 1272 
(7th Cir. 1984) (“convinced”). 
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The least rigid standard proposed by courts is the “preponder-
ance” standard.  A minority of courts have taken the position that a 
court may disregard Supreme Court precedent if it is more likely 
than not that the Supreme Court itself would overrule the questioned 
precedent.
175
  This standard may be an overly relaxed vision of the 
concept of stare decisis.
176
  If a court is simply predicting whether it is 
probable that the Supreme Court may overrule a questioned deci-
sion, the court gives little weight to the precedent.  Such a practice 




2. Judge Posner’s Analysis 
Judge Posner, prior to Rodriguez, had endorsed the right of a 
court to disregard arguably dead Supreme Court precedent and in 
fact wrote the opinions in several of the above cited cases.
178
  At first 
glance, Judge Posner’s analysis of the standard applicable to ques-
tionable Supreme Court precedent seems confusing.  Further analy-
sis, however, relieves this confusion and supplies a single standard to 
be applied. 
Judge Posner argued that lower courts have the right to disre-
gard Supreme Court precedent where utilizing that precedent would 
be to apply dead law.
179
  He never referred to such a decision as antic-
ipatory overruling.  In contrast, when engaging in what has since 
been labeled anticipatory overruling, Judge Posner stated that 
[the court is] not “overruling” [Supreme Court precedent] . . . .  
Constitutional law is very largely a prediction of how the Supreme 
Court will decide particular issues when presented to it for deci-
sion.  Ordinarily the best predictor of how the Court will decide 
an issue in a future case is how it decided the same issue in a past 
case, and when that is so the law is what is stated in the earlier de-
cision. But sometimes later decisions, though not explicitly over-
ruling or even mentioning an earlier decision, indicate that the 
Court very probably will not decide the issue the same way the 
 
 175 See, e.g., Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. Walsh, 139 F.2d 809, 814 (2d Cir. 1943). 
 176 See Bradford, supra note 13, at 46–47. 
 177 Cf. Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 715 
(2005) (stating that “prediction . . . undermines the rule of law by over-emphasizing 
the role of individual judges”). 
 178 See Colby, 811 F.2d at 1123; Olson v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 806 
F.2d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 1986); 
Indianapolis Airport Auth. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 733 F.2d 1262, 1272 (7th Cir. 1984); 
Minority Police Officers Ass’n. v. South Bend, 721 F.2d 197, 201 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 179 Norris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 904 (7th Cir. 1982). 
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next time.  In such a case, to continue to follow the earlier case 




Judge Posner seemed to believe that analyzing the continuing 
validity of Supreme Court precedent is not only the right but the duty 




In subsequent opinions, Judge Posner addressed the right to dis-
regard dead precedent and used varying terms, which may have 
caused confusion as to what standard should be applied.  In Norris, 
Judge Posner stated that a court may disregard precedent where it is 
“very probable” that the Supreme Court will no longer follow the 
questioned precedent.
182
  One year later, in Minority Police Officers 
Ass’n v. South Bend,183 he described the standard as “strong evidence” 
that the Supreme Court would overrule the precedent if it had the 
chance.
184
  Yet another year later, in Indianapolis Airport Authority v. 
American Airlines, Inc.,
185
 Judge Posner described the standard simply 
as “convinced” that the Court would overrule if given the opportuni-
ty.
186
  Although one may interpret a convinced standard to be less ri-
gid than either very probable or strong evidence, further analysis of 
the language leads to the inevitable conclusion that the standard re-
mains the same.  When defining the standard as “convinced that the 
Court would overrule the decision if it had the opportunity to do so,” 
Judge Posner cited directly to Norris, which defined the standard as 
very probable.
187
  Judge Posner did not intend to alter the standard 
set forth in his previous opinions; if he did have such intent, he 
would not have provided a direct citation to those standards when ar-
ticulating his opinion. 
Next, in Olson v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc.,
188
 Judge 
Posner described the standard as “almost certain.”189  Again, when de-
fining the standard, Judge Posner provided a direct citation to Nor-
 
 180 Id. 
 181 See id. 
 182 Id. at 904. 
 183 721 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 184 Id. at 201. 
 185 733 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 186 Id. at 1272. 
 187 Id. (citing Norris, 687 F.2d at 902–04). 
 188 806 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 189 Id. at 734. 
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ris.
190
  Finally, in Colby v. J.C. Penney Co.,
191
 Judge Posner articulated the 
standard as “powerfully convinced that the Court would overrule it at 
the first opportunity.”192  This quotation directly cites to Olson, which 
in turn directly cites to Norris.
193
 
The result of this chain of opinions that cite to one another for 
direct support is simple—Judge Posner sets forth but one standard 
for courts analyzing whether Supreme Court precedent is dead law.  
Whether Judge Posner calls the standard very probable, strong evi-
dence, convinced, almost certain, or powerfully convinced, his view of 
the standard remains the same.  A court should consider whether ap-
plying of the precedent in question would constitute applying dead 
law.  According to Posner’s analysis, this takes more than a balancing 
of the scale or a “more probable than not” analysis; a court must ex-
hibit a strong degree of certainty that likely mirrors the most rigid 
standard discussed above.
194
  Supreme Court law is dead where the 
precedent has been eroded by subsequent Supreme Court holdings 
and the application of that law would be contrary to the more recent 
holding or rule of law.  If the precedent is severely eroded, a state 
court should be nearly certain that the Court would overrule the 
precedent before pronouncing its death.
195
  Essentially, the analysis 
that a state court should undertake before disregarding Supreme 
Court precedent is a two-step test: the court should (1) decide if the 
precedent in question has been eroded by the Supreme Court and 
(2) be nearly certain that the Court would overrule the eroded law. 
3. State Courts Should Apply Judge Posner’s Standard 
Judge Posner’s standard appears to express both a need for cer-
tainty and a high probability that the Court would overrule its 
precedent.
196
  These standards were set forth separately above to illu-
strate the confusion that has plagued courts and scholars alike in de-
termining when a court should disregard what it perceives to be out-
dated precedent.  An analysis of Judge Posner’s opinions, however, 
seems to lead to the conclusion that the standards are one and the 
same.  A high probability that a particular event will occur axiomati-
 
 190 Id. (citing Norris, 687 F.2d at 902–04). 
 191 811 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 192 Id. at 1123. 
 193 Id. (citing Olson, 806 F.2d 731). 
 194 See Norris, 687 F.2d at 904. 
 195 See id. (discussing dead law); see also Kniffin, supra note 29, at 61–64 (discussing 
erosion). 
 196 See Norris, 687 F.2d at 904; Olson, 806 F.2d at 734. 
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cally nears certainty that it will indeed happen.  Furthermore, it is un-
likely that any case will ever present a formula for determining the 
probability that the Supreme Court would overrule.  Therefore, a 
court should not concern itself with the differing definitions of high 
probability and near certainty; it should simply look to the Supreme 
Court opinion that erodes the precedent in question and determine 
if the newer decision creates a high degree of certainty that the ques-
tioned precedent is dead law.
197
 
VIII.THE POSNER STANDARD APPLIED TO ALL FACTORS  
CONCERNING HELLER 
State courts have been and will continue to be faced with the di-
lemma of whether to treat Cruikshank as dead law.  Thus far, New 
York has been faced with a legal issue that resulted in a Heller analysis 
without addressing the issue of incorporation.
198
  Specifically, the 
court considered whether a New York gun regulation violated the 
Second Amendment.
199
  The court rejected the argument and noted 
that Heller allows for reasonable regulations.
200
  The fact that the New 
York court did not address incorporation can be viewed in one of two 
ways.  One possibility is that the court found that Heller provided an 
on-point analysis of the issue that was sufficient to support the judg-
ment even assuming incorporation and therefore did not need to 
address the incorporation issue.  On the other hand, the court possi-
bly took incorporation for granted.  The New York court could have 
simply issued a ruling that held that Heller did not apply to New York 
law.  Such a decision, however, may be a red flag for Supreme Court 
review; the court’s holding was much safer because the court did not 
engage in an incorporation analysis.  Where a court’s finding is con-
sistent with Heller’s regulation analysis, a court may not want to ad-
dress Cruikshank or incorporation; however, where a state gun regula-
tion may not be consistent with Heller, a state court may be forced to 
discuss the incorporation issue. 
Prior to Heller, Cruikshank’s validity may have been undermined 
when the Supreme Court decided to adopt the selective-
incorporation doctrine.
201




 197 See Norris, 687 F.2d at 904. 
 198 See People v. Lynch, No. 2005-2007, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4587, at *1–2 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. July 16, 2008) (holding that Heller allows for reasonable regulation of fire-
arms). 
 199 Id. at *1. 
 200 Id. at *1–2. 
 201 See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963). 
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noted that “Cruikshank and Presser involved direct application and in-
corporation through the Privileges or Immunities Clause, but not in-
corporation through the Due Process Clause.”203  The Ninth Circuit 
then went on to hold the Second Amendment to be incorporated 
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
204
  
Modern incorporation doctrine may lead the Court to reach an out-
come contrary to that of Cruikshank, just as the Ninth Circuit did.
205
  
Also, the validity of Cruikshank has been undermined because it stated 
that both the First and Second Amendments were not incorporated.  
The First Amendment has since been incorporated, which calls into 
question both the reasoning and holding of Cruikshank.
206
  Moreover, 
although Heller declined to address the issue of incorporation, the 
Court noted that Cruikshank did not engage in a modern incorpora-
tion analysis and did not incorporate the First Amendment.
207
  Finally, 
Heller cited to several authorities that use natural-rights language that 
may be a nod to incorporation.
208
 
A. Incorporation of the First Amendment Undermines Cruikshank’s 
Reasoning 
As early as 1925, the Supreme Court undermined the holding of 
Cruikshank by incorporating the First Amendment in Gitlow v. New 
York.
209
  Gitlow arguably overruled Cruikshank insofar as the First 
Amendment is concerned and casts a shadow of doubt upon Cruik-
shank’s reasoning regarding the Second Amendment.210  A court, 
however, may overrule any portion of an opinion while leaving the 




 202 Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 203 Id. at 448. 
 204 See id. at 457. 
 205 See id. 
 206 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
 207 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2813 n.23 (2008). 
 208 See id. at 2792 n.7, 2793. 
 209 See Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666. 
 210 Gitlow may have assumed incorporation arguendo, but subsequent Supreme 
Court opinions confirmed the First Amendment’s incorporation.  See, e.g., Near v. 
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931) (“It is no longer open to doubt that the liberty 
of the press and of speech is within the liberty safeguarded by the [D]ue [P]rocess 
[C]lause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action.”). 
 211 See, e.g., Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978) 
(overruling Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), “insofar as it holds that local gov-
ernments are wholly immune from suit”). 
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B. Modern Incorporation Doctrine Undermines Cruikshank 
Although Gitlow in and of itself may not render Cruikshank dead 
law, further doubt is cast upon Cruikshank by the rise of modern in-
corporation doctrine.  In Duncan v. Louisiana, the Court endorsed 
the selective-incorporation doctrine.
212
  Cruikshank did not engage in 
a modern incorporation analysis; the Court simply announced that 
the Second Amendment only applies to the national government.
213
  
Courts now engage in an incorporation analysis and decide whether a 
constitutional protection is made applicable to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
214
Undoubtedly, a change in doctrine calls 
into question a decision based on the older doctrine.  This change in 
doctrine, however, does not itself undermine Cruikshank’s holding 
that the Second Amendment is not incorporated if subsequent deci-
sions affirming Cruikshank apply the relevant doctrine.  Although un-
likely, the case may be that under modern incorporation doctrine, 
Cruikshank still stands.  Cases since Cruikshank have also held that the 
Second Amendment is not incorporated.
215
  The cases that support 
Cruikshank’s non-incorporation of the Second Amendment, however, 
suffer from the same flaw from which Cruikshank suffers; they pre-
date the incorporation era and therefore do not engage in the incor-
poration analysis now required by the courts.
216
 
Cruikshank mentions the Second Amendment but once and does 
not give the concept of incorporation any thought or analysis what-
soever.  The Court simply states that “[t]he second amendment . . . 
means no more than that [the right to bear arms] shall not be in-
fringed by Congress.”217  Therefore, Cruikshank has been eroded by a 
change in doctrine; it did not engage in the incorporation analysis 
now required by the courts nor did the subsequent cases that support 
it.
218
  Erosion of the precedent by a change in legal doctrine may or 
may not be enough for a state court to consider Cruikshank to be 
dead law.  For example, the Ninth Circuit found that Cruikshank was 
 
 212 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 163–71 (1968). 
 213 See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876). 
 214 See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 147–49. 
 215 See Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 
265 (1886). 
 216 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2813 n.23 (2008) (stating that 
the Fourteenth Amendment inquiry set forth by later cases is now required).  Com-
pare Miller, 153 U.S. at 538, and Presser, 116 U.S. at 265, with Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 
U.S. 145, 157–58 (1968). 
 217 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876). 
 218 See Miller, 153 U.S. at 538; Presser, 116 U.S. at 265; Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553. 
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dead law because it did not conduct a modern incorporation analy-
sis,
219




C. Heller Directly Undermines Cruikshank 
Heller states that “[w]ith respect to Cruikshank’s continuing valid-
ity on incorporation, a question not presented by this case, we note 
that Cruikshank also said that the First Amendment did not apply 
against the States and did not engage in the sort of Fourteenth 
Amendment inquiry required by our later cases.”221  Cruikshank did 
not engage in a detailed analysis of the Second Amendment nor did 
it supply the required Fourteenth Amendment incorporation analy-
sis.
222
  Although Heller consciously chose not to overrule Cruikshank, it 
clearly damaged its precedential value.
223
  Cruikshank’s dismissive 
analysis of incorporation would be unlikely to satisfy modern incor-
poration doctrine.  Furthermore, Heller directly damaged the contin-
uing validity of Cruikshank by noting its lack of a modern incorpora-
tion analysis.
224
  Therefore, with little left for the Cruikshank decision 
to rest on, a state court could rightfully find Cruikshank to be dead 
law. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
A state court indeed has the ability to disregard Supreme Court 
precedent that it finds to be dead law.  This is supported by the un-
derlying concepts of both anticipatory overruling and unbound state 
courts, which illustrate that stare decisis is not simply blind adherence 
to precedent.  The ability of a state court to disregard Supreme Court 
precedent, however, is also not absolute.  Before exercising this abili-
ty, a state court should come to a conclusion that the precedent in 
question is dead law.  This would mean that because of Supreme 
Court action a court would be applying law that the Supreme Court 
itself has undermined.  This erosion of precedent coupled with a 
high degree of certainty that the eroded precedent will no longer be 
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followed by the Supreme Court authorizes state courts to disregard 
the dead law. 
The question of how a state court should treat Cruikshank in the 
face of Heller is an excellent illustration of the scope of a state court’s 
right to disregard Supreme Court precedent.  Cruikshank was under-
mined by many different factors that are all relevant to the scope of 
this power.  The Court’s treatment of Cruikshank in Heller indicates 
direct erosion of precedent and the changing trends of Supreme 
Court doctrine.
225
  In the end, a combination of those factors demon-
strates that a state court may treat Cruikshank as dead law in light of 
Heller and therefore may disregard the precedent. 
Surely the analysis set forth in this Comment is not limited to 
Cruikshank.  State courts should conduct this analysis whenever Su-
preme Court precedent seems questionable.  The analysis protects 
the interests of stare decisis by limiting proper erosion to Supreme 
Court action while also considering the need for a state to keep its 
laws in line with current decisions of the Court.  Notions of federal-
ism and the idea of states as laboratories may support this right more 
readily for state courts than for federal courts; therefore, the Court’s 
denial of a federal court’s ability to overrule Supreme Court 
precedent possibly cannot and should not extend to a state court’s 
ability to disregard dead law.  Stare decisis is not offended where the 
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